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CONTROLLING THE GROWTH OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
RICHARD ALLEN*
S EVENTEEN YEARS HAVE PASSED since the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals held, in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. ' that punitive damages were recoverable in a strict
products liability action. Today the notion that the culpa-
bility of a manufacturer's conduct can be evaluated within
the context of strict products liability is accepted in over
32 states.2
* LL.B. Georgetown University, 1961; Attorney at Law, Lane, Powell, Moss &
Miller, Seattle, Washington.
1 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). Toole involved the distribu-
tion of MER/29, a drug developed to lower blood cholesterol levels. The drug
also induced the development of cataracts in its users. See also J. Ghiardi & J.
Kircher, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.05 (1985).
2 Meyers & Barrus, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases: A Survey, 51 INS.
COUNSEL J. 212 (1984). Punitive damages in products liability cases are author-
ized by common law in 29 states. Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d
134 (Ala. 1976); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified,
615 P.2d 621 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Ferguson v. Cessna Aircraft
Co.,. 643 P.2d 1017 (Ariz. 1981); Forrest City Machine Works, Inc. v. Aderhold,
273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal.
App.2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Alley v. Gubser Development Co., 569 F.
Supp. 36 (D. Colo. 1983); Cloroben Chemical Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887
(Del. 1983); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Kicklighter v. Nails ByJanee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying
Georgia law); Beerman v. Toro Mfg. Corp., 615 P.2d 749 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980);
Moore v. Remington Arms, Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 427 N.E.2d 608 (1981);
Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981); Sioux City
Community School Dist. v. IT&T Corp., 461 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Can-
trell v. Amarillo Hardware Co., 226 Kan. 681, 602 P.2d 1326 (Kan. 1979); Racer
v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), appeal dism'd, 459 U.S. 803
(1982); Leslie v.Jones Chemical Co., 551 P.2d 234 (Nev. 1976); Roginsky v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (applying New York law);
Robinson v. Parker-Hannifen Corp., 4 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 447 N.E.2d 781 (1982);
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The adolescent years of the punitive damages doctrine
in the products liability field have been dangerous ones.
The pages of daily newspapers and legal periodicals fre-
quently are filled with stories about juries rendering
seven, eight and even nine-figure punitive damage
awards. The number of punitive damage awards against
certain manufacturers is growing at almost exponential
rates. One manufacturer, the Johns-Manville Corpora-
tion, has sought at least a temporary refuge in the bank-
ruptcy courts from the financially devastating cumulative
effects of high compensatory and punitive awards.
Manville's plight represents the fulfillment of Judge
Friendly's worst fears about extending the availability of
punitive damages to products liability cases,4 namely that
Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515 (Okla. 1983); Neal v. Carey Cana-
dian Mines, LTd., 548 F.Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Campus Sweater & Sports-
Wear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Const. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d
877 (4th Cir. 198 1);Johnson v. Husky Indust., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976)
(applying Tennessee law); Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.
1972) (applying Texas law); Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 297 S.E.2d 675 (Va.
1982); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980). Additionally
three states authorize puntive damages in products liablity cases by statute. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1983) (punitive damages limited
to twice the amount of compensatory damages); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West
Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(1) (1980). Two states permit punitive dam-
ages only in product liability cases based upon negligence. American Laundry
Mach. Indust. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980); Gold v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J.1982). Four states do not allow the
recovery of punitive damages in products liability cases. Philippe v. Browning
Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 395 So. 2d
310 (La. 1982); Hawes Office Systems, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories, Inc., 537 F.
Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying Massachusetts law); Miller v. Kingsley, 230
N.W.2d 472 (Neb. 1975); Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66 (N.H. 1972).
-1 See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). On August 26,
1982, Manville and 20 of its subsidiaries filed petitions for reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Manville alleges that its financial difficulties
have arisen from its position as a defendant in 11,000 asbestos-related personal
injury and products liability damage suits brought by 15,500 plaintiffs in 46 states.
Approximately 425 new suits are being filed each month. Manville anticipates
32,000 additional claims in the next 27 years. It has already been assesed punitive
damages in several cases and Manville anticipates that its liabilities eventually will
exceed over $2 billion. Id. at 422.
4 See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967)
(Friendly, J.):
We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive
damages in such multiplicty of actions throughout the nations can
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
such actions could result in financial injury so severe that
it becomes a form of corporate capital punishment. Every
major aviation casualty elicits product liability claims and
it has become commonplace that these claims incorporate
product liability allegations. Moreover, aviation products
manufacturers have suffered adverse punitive awards of
substantial dimension.5
As punitive damages claims become increasingly preva-
lent in all products liability actions, the question arises
whether the doctrine itself remains as standardless and
widely unpredictable as its reputation suggests, or
whether almost two decades of tenure in the products lia-
bility arena has lent the doctrine a more definable form
and greater predictability. This article will examine how
courts and juries have used punitive damages in strict
products liability cases. It will review the standards of
conduct applied by various jurisdictions in assessing puni-
tive damages and analyze the specific factors that affect
both the decision to award punitive damages and the size
of the verdicts. Finally, the article will focus on ways in
which courts are responding to legitimate concerns of de-
fendants regarding the abuse of the punitive damage rem-
edy by juries.
I. JUSTIFICATION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN STRICT
LIABILITY CASES
Courts in every state that permit recovery of punitive
damages in strict products liability cases have to resolve
the apparent conflict between the concept of liability with-
out fault necessary for the award of punitive damages.
be so administered as to avoid overkill ... on the other hand, the
apparent impracticability of imposing an effective ceiling on punitive
awards in hundreds of suits in different courts may result in an ag-
gregate which, when piled on large compensatory damages, could
reach catastrophic amounts.
Id. at 839, 841.
For a discussion of punitive damages awards against aircraft manufacturers
see Haskell, The Aircraft 11anufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Damages - The
Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40J. AIR L. & CoM. 595 (1974).
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Courts have been accomplishing this task by differentiat-
ing between a manufacturer's liability as a matter of law for
producing a defective product and introducing a defective
or dangerous product into the stream of commerce, and
the manufacturer's culpability for introducing the defective
product and/or its failure to adequately warn the con-
sumer of the product's dangerous propensities.6
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Wangen v.
Ford Motor Company7 is representative of the reasoning
used to resolve this conflict. The plaintiffs in Wangen were
seriously injured in a car fire when the fuel tank of their
1967 Ford Mustang ruptured after being struck by an-
other car. Ford asserted that punitive damages were only
recoverable in actions based on intentional torts and
therefore were not available under the plaintiff's strict lia-
bility theory.8 The court concluded that punitive damages
awards rest on the kind of conduct displayed rather than
the specific elements of the underlying tort theory relied
upon by the plaintiffs. 9
In Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter,'0 the plaintiffs sued Piper
Aircraft on claims based on strict liability and negligence
for deaths resulting from the crash of a Piper aircraft."
Plaintiffs claimed that the aircraft contained a faulty door
latch and that the crash occurred as a result of the pilot
losing control of the plane when the door unexpectedly
opened during flight.' 2 Thejury found Piper liable on the
strict liability claim.' 3 Piper appealed, claiming that puni-
tive damages were improper in the absence of a finding of
negligence.' 4
" See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective
Products, 49 U. Cni. L. REV. 1, 28 (1982).
7 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
" 294 N.W. 2d at 440.
Id. at 442.
426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 436 So. 2d 100
(Fla. 1983).





The court, following the Wangen approach, affirmed the
punitive damage award.1 5 The court reasoned that the
doctrine of strict products liability merely renders proof
of specific acts of negligence unnecessary.' 6 Relief from
this burden does not make consideration of the manufac-
turer's conduct either inappropriate or inconsistent.1 7
The Colorado Supreme Court more recently has drawn
a sharper line between strict liability's goal of compensat-
ing for the harm caused by defective products and puni-
tive damages' goal of punishing highly culpable
conduct.' The court observed that:
The principles of strict liability, however, are ill-equipped
to deal with problems at the other end of the culpability
scale, that is, when an injury results from the marketing of
a product in flagrant disregard of consumer safety.' 9
The Colorado court's language reflects the view of
many state courts that punitive damages are an effective
tool for achieving the goals of punishment and deter-
rence. Some courts have defended the unpredictable na-
ture of punitive damage awards for furthering the
deterrence objective. The reasoning is that the harder it
is for manufacturers to predict the way juries will react to
specific instances of "outrageous conduct," the more dif-
ficult it will be to pass along the financial consequences of
a punitive damages verdict as a cost of doing business.2z
This reasoning might be acceptable if the standard for de-
termining the kind of conduct that is truly outrageous was
fixed at an appropriate level and if all the relevent factors
that influence the aggravation or mitigation of a punitive
damage award were considered by juries. Unfortunately,
at the present time, this is not the case.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1109, n.1.
.7 Id.
'" Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
Id. at 218.
2" See Owen, supra note 6, at 27.
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II. STANDARDS AND FACTORS GOVERNING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS
A. The Threshold Test
There are few meaningful differences among the states
in the various formulations of the standard of conduct
necessary to permit a punitive damage award. Most stan-
dards are phrased in terms of willful or wanton miscon-
duct, malice, fraud, and conscious or reckless disregard
for the rights or the safety of others.2 '
The problem with the employment of these traditional
standards of punitive damage liability in product liability
cases is that they were designed to be used in connection
with intentional tort and negligence concepts, but not in
conjunction with the doctrine of strict liability in tort.22
The fundamental tenets of products liability law involve a
weighing of the benefits of making mass-produced prod-
ucts available to a greater number of consumers against
the risk of injury or harm from such products. An analysis
of the probabilities and a reverence for consumer choice
are important considerations in the marketing decision.
Moreover, nearly every product that is manufactured is
the result of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of decisions
involving assessments of costs, benefits and risks. Yet,
under most definitions of the standard of conduct under
which punitive damage claims are evaluated, these consid-
erations are largely ignored.
The State of California's punitive damages law permits
recovery when the defendant has been guilty of "oppres-
sion, fraud or malice." 23 The problems of applying such
imprecise terms in the context of a products liability ac-
tion were particularly evident in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Company,"4 the celebrated Pinto case. The trial court, in
its instructions to the jury, defined malice as "motive and
21 SeeJ. Ghiardi, supra note 1, at § 6.19; Meyers & Barrus, supra note 3, at 212-
13.
2' Owen, supra note 6, at 21.
21 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1985).
' 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 5
willingness to vex, harass, annoy or injure another per-
son."2 5 The court went on to explain that malice could be
inferred if the defendant's conduct was "wilful, inten-
tional and done in conscious disregard of its possible re-
sults."' 26 The jury returned a punitive damage award of
$125 million against Ford. The amount was later reduced
to $3.5 million.27
On appeal, the court rejected Ford's argument that the
malice instructions should have borne some relationship
to the manufacturing and marketing context in which the
decisions were made. Ford urged that the malice instruc-
tion required the phrase "conscious disregard of the
probability [or alternatively the high probability] of injury
to others' 28 in order to preclude prejudicial error. How-
ever, the Court of Appeals found no reversible error in
the trial court's formulation of the instruction.
The danger with punitive damage instructions of the
kind approved in Gnimshaw is that they open the door to
punitive damages for any possible danger that could be
remotely imagined by a manufacturer and not remedied,
regardless of the likelihood that the contemplated danger
would ever occur.2 9 The shortcoming of the malice stan-
dard applied in Grimshaw was its failure to adequately
bring into consideration the extent of the manufacturer's
awareness of the danger flowing from the design, and the
scope of the risk that the design presented to the public.3 0
Nevertheless, the reviewing court concluded that the
plaintiff's proof of the car's defective fuel tank design
overcame any possible imprecision in the malice
instruction. 1
2 174 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
26, Id.
27 Id. at 358.
28 id. at 386-87.
2 Owen, supra note 6, at 22.
.- Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257,
1366 (1976).
1 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 816-17, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 386-87 (1981).
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The need to change the standard of conduct necessary
for obtaining a punitive damage award has been recog-
nized in several jurisdictions. At least two states have
adopted the standard of "flagrant indifference to the pub-
lic safety."' 32 The advantage of this standard is its move-
ment away from the subjective measurement of the
manufacturer's "state of mind," commonly associated
with the criminal law, and toward an objective determina-
tion of a manufacturer's conduct within the context of
product design and production.3 3
The State of Connecticut has enacted a new statute that
attempts to align the punitive damage standard more
closely to the manufacturing environment. 4 Under the
statute, manufacturers are liable for punitive damages
when they act in "reckless disregard for the safety of
product users, consumers or others who are injured by
the product."3 5 The statute also limits punitive damage
recoveries to no more than twice the compensatory dam-
age award. 6
The majority of courts have predicated punitive damage
awards in product liability cases on such traditional liabil-
ity standards as "willful, wanton, malicious, conscious, or
reckless disregard of the rights of others. 3 7 Professor
Owen has criticized this approach arguing that since
"malice" could be inferred from the defendant's conduct
if the conduct was willful, intentional and done in con-
scious disregard of its possible result, [then] the totally un-
2 Owen, supra note 6 at 21. See Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d
1102, 427 N.E.2d 608 (1982); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St.
2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
..1 Owen, supra note 6, at 21.
. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West 1985).
" Id.
" Id.
.7 Owen, supra note 6, at 21. See, e.g., Strum, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38
(Alaska 1979) (reckless indifference to rights of others); Ferguson v. Cessna Air-
craft Co., 132 Ariz. 47, 643 P.2d 1017 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (reckless or wanton
disregard of the rights of others); Thiry v. Armstrong World Indust., 661 P.2d 515
(Okla. 1982) (reckless disregard for public safety); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d
916 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (conscious indifference to
plaintiff's rights).
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
acceptable import of this standard is that every actor could
be held strictly liable thereunder for punitive, in additon
to compensatory damages for any consequence to any per-
son that was contemplated in advance of any course of
38action.
A second major issue involving the standards for puni-
tive damage awards is the level of proof required for each
element of the claim. Manufacturers have regularly ar-
gued that allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive damages
on the basis of proof by a mere preponderance of the evi-
dence or by a "more probable than not" standard
amounts to a denial of due process. 9 If punitive damages
are at least in theory a quasi-criminal remedy enforced by
individuals who are indicating both their own and the
public's outrage at the acts of the manufacturer, then no-
tions of fundamental fairness suggest a high threshold of
proof is necessary.40
The consistent refusal of courts to recognize the valid-
ity of the standard of proof arguments raised by defend-
ants has motivated two states to establish higher
standards by statute. Both Minnesota and Oregon have
adopted the "clear and convincing evidence" test.41 The
State of Wisconsin adopted the same standard in the
Wangen case. 42 The State of Colorado has gone a step fur-
ther and now requires plaintiffs to prove their punitive
damage claims beyond a reasonable doubt.4 3
The advantages of establishing a higher standard of
proof go beyond remedying the surface-level impression
of unfairness. A higher standard impresses upon juries
the importance of their decision and reduces the risk of
-1" Owen, supra note 6, at 21-2.
311 See, e.g., Palmer v. Robins Co. Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 214-15 (1984); Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 818, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 387 (1981).
41 See Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages and Proce-
dures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 296 (1983).
41 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West. Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.925(1) (1981).
42 See WVangen, 97 Wis. 2d 290, 294 N.W.2d 434 (1980).
41 See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1973).
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erroneous judgements that will require judicially imposed
reversals or remittiturs. One commentator has suggested
that a higher standard, such as the clear and convincing
evidence test, compensates for the imbalance between the
risk of an enormous punitive damage judgement adverse
to the defendant and the risk of judgment adverse to the
plaintiff.44
While further legislative actions to reform the burden
of proof are possible, courts also may be propelled by the
reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court toward rede-
fining the threshold standard by which juries approach
punitive damages in a strict liability context.
B. Factors Affecting the Determination and Calculation of
Punitive Damage Awards
These three factors have historically been linked to the
determination and calculation of punitive damages: 1)
"the character of the defendant's act; 2) the nature and
extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant
caused or intended to cause; and 3) the wealth of the de-
fendant."' 45 The first factor relates to the quasi-criminal
function of punishment for outrageous conduct.46 The
second factor recognizes that the extent of harm caused
may be a consideration in the size of an actual damage
award, a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages.4 7
The third factor is intended to equate the degree of pun-
ishment or deterrence with the means of the defendant.
While these factors regularly find their way into jury in-
structions in products liability cases, a more useful way to
understand what factors control modern punitive damage
awards is to review the type of conduct by manufacturers
that appears to influence jury verdicts. Most punitive
44 Wheeler, supra note 40, at 297.
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977).
41; Id. comment b.
47 Id. comment c. A Connecticut Superior Court Judge recently held that a pu-
nitive damage award is permitted in connection with a products liability claim in-
volving only damage to property. American Airlines Inc. v. National Automatic
Products Co., Conn. S. Ct., file no. 279359 (1984).
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
damage claims in products liability actions are based on a
combination of five general varieties of conduct; 1) fraud;
2) knowing violation of established safety standards; 3) in-
adequate testing and/or manufacturing procedures; 4)
failure to warn customers of known dangers of products
when those dangers are first recognized; and 5) post-mar-
keting failure to remedy dangers that are known or be-
come known to the manufacturer.4 8
These categories of conduct reflect various expecta-
tions that have developed through mass marketing of
products to several generations of consumers. Consum-
ers have developed the expectation that all products will
be designed to meet or exceed minimum government or
industry standards, that important information regarding
the use of the product will be communicated at the time of
purchase or use, and that the manufacturer will communi-
cate any subsequently acquired information about the
product that may affect the consumer's health or safety.
Finally, consumers expect that manufacturers will have
tried to minimize potential injury at every step in the de-
sign, manufacturing and marketing process. Certain cate-
gories of conduct have been prominent in specific
industries, as the following review of cases illustrates.
1. Automobiles
The actions of automobile manufacturers have involved
all five categories of conduct more often than the manu-
facturers of other forms of transportation, although this
likely is due to the larger volume of units produced. Both
Ford and American Motors Corporation ("AMC") have
faced multiple punitive damage verdicts in cases involving
defectively designed fuel tanks. In Wagen v. Ford Motor
Company,49 facts were presented that defects in the design
of the fuel system and the lack of a barrier between the
gas tank and the passenger compartment in the 1967
48 Owen, supra note 30, at 1326.
49 97 Wis.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
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Mustang came to Ford's attention during design tests in
1964.50 The plaintiffs also established that Ford knew
these defects caused serious injuries after the car had en-
tered the market, that it knew how to correct these de-
fects, that it concealed this information from the public,
and that it chose not to recall the vehicles. 5'
The Florida Court of Appeals was confronted with sim-
ilar facts in American Motors Corporation v. Ellis.5' Again,
plaintiffs alleged that the severe injuries they sustained in
a fiery highway collision resulted from a defectively
designed fuel-fill system. They also alleged that AMC
knew that the fuel tank was defective, but that it chose not
to seek safer, alternative designs.53 The Florida Court of
Appeals used the case to establish the rule that punitive
damages are recoverable in strict products liability cases.
Defectively designed fuel tanks have been the center-
piece of several other large punitive damage awards. In
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 54 the manufacturer's knowledge
that the Pinto's fuel tank and rear passenger compartment
would expose passengers to serious injury or death in 20-
30 mph collisions, and evidence of the company's con-
scious balancing of the dollar cost in human casualties
against the expense of remedying the defect, led the jury
to conclude that Ford's conduct was highly culpable.55
A substantially similar fact pattern also produced a
large punitive damage verdict in Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll.56
The case involved a defectively designed fuel tank in the
1973 Toyota Corona. 57 The plaintiffs introduced evi-
dence that the manufacturer was aware of the safety
problems associated with the design as early as 1966.58
50 Id. at 462.
-5 Id.
52 403 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1981).
.5 Id. at 468.
.4 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
.r Id. at 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
51i 438 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1983).
.7 Id. at 195.
.5 Id.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Toyota changed the fuel tank configuration on all of its
1973 model cars except the Corona. 9 The Florida Court
of Appeals affirmed the jury's determination that Toyota's
decision to market the Corona, after knowing of the de-
fect, was conduct in wanton disregard of public safety.
The appellate court also affirmed the jury's $2 million
compensatory and $3 million punitive damage verdict.60
Juries are cognizant of the good or bad faith displayed
by manufacturers in addressing the problems of product
defects identified in the post-marketing period. In Hasson
v. Ford Motor Co.,61 the California Court of Appeals af-
firmed a large verdict in favor of a plaintiff who suffered
severe brain damage and physical disabilities in a collision
caused by brake failure. Evidence of particular signifi-
cance to the result was Ford's knowledge of the brake
problem from complaints of both dealers and customers,
and Ford's subsequent failure to remedy the defects.62
The plaintiff was awarded $7.5 million in compensatory
damages and $4 million in punitive damages. 63 The com-
pensatory award was later reduced to make the total re-
covery $9.2 million.64
The automobile cases show that evidence of a consis-
tent attitude of indifference to known dangers will result
in high, punitive damage awards. By contrast, experience
in other transportation industries suggests that measures
undertaken by manufacturers to mitigate potential dan-
gers flowing from product defects can reduce, if not pre-
vent, punitive damage verdicts.
2. Aircraft
Punitive damage claims against aircraft manufacturers
have been based upon a combination of conduct different
59 Id.
Id. at 193.
32 Cal. 3d 388, 650 P.2d 1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1982).
62 Id. at 402-03, 650 P.2d at 1180, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
,;:, Id. at 398, 650 P.2d at 1177, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
64 Id.
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from their counterparts in the automobile industy. The
costs and safety risks associated with crash testing produc-
tion models of aircraft is perhaps the most obvious differ-
ence between the industries. Aircraft manufacturers,
nevertheless, have been assessed punitive damages for
failure to design their products in a manner that mini-
mizes likely injuries from foreseeable accidents.6 5
Aircraft manufacturers have been successful in either
holding down or preventing punitive damage awards by
introducing evidence of actions undertaken to warn con-
sumers once design defects are detected. In Kritser v.
Beech Aircraft Corp. ,66 plaintiffs claimed that the crash of a
twin-engined Beech Baron was the result of a defectively
designed fuel tank. When certain maneuvers were per-
formed with low levels of fuel in the tanks, air rather than
fuel would flow into the engines, causing a loss of
power.67 Beech became aware of the situation prior to the
crash of the decedent's plane and had consulted with the
Federal Aviation Administration on the appropriate meas-
ures for addressing the problem.68 Two months before
the accident, the decedent received a flight manual sup-
plement warning owners of the fuel tank problem and the
kinds of maneuvers that should be avoided.69
Although a compensatory damage verdict of $310,000
was returned, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial judge's refusal to submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury. The trial judge concluded that the
steps Beech took to warn Kritser of the dangerous condi-
tion exhibited the requisite good faith necessary to pro-
hibit a punitive damage instruction.70
115 See Owen, supra note 30, at 1341, 399-400; Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No.
70-9255-6 (193dJudicial Dist. of Texas 1972) (unreported case) (failure to design
a crash-worthy aircraft resulted in an award to plaintiffs of $200,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $180,000 in punitive damages).
'w 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973).
67 Id. at 1091.
-" Id. at 1094.
, Id.
71 Id. at 1097.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A California court, hearing a case based upon the same
fuel tank defect, permitted a punitive damage instruction.
The jury returned a verdict that included $3.45 million in
punitive damages. 71 The two cases, however, were distin-
guishable. The California case was based on fraud.72 The
evidence indicated that the pilot had not received the re-
vised manual containing the warning from the manufac-
turer, although the warning had been issued before the
accident took place. 3 The California Court of Appeals
reversed the punitive damage verdict because it was pre-
cluded under California's wrongful death statute. 4
Compliance with industry standards and government
regulations is an important factor in proving good faith
on the part of the manufacturer. In Ferguson v. Cessna Air-
craft Co.,75 the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a trial
judge's refusal to submit the issue of punitive damages to
a jury in a products liability action. The plaintiffs claimed
that the crash of a Cessna Centurion after the left wing
came off in flight was the result of defectively designed
control surfaces on the wings.76 Experts testified that the
most probable cause of the accident was a loose aileron
cable which resulted in a fluttering of the control sur-
faces. 77 The court relied on the fact that the FAA had cer-
tified the design of the aircraft to conclude that Cessna
had not wantonly disregarded FAA regulations.78
Aircraft manufacturers have fared no better than auto-
mobile manufacturers who fail to disclose dangerous de-
fects. In Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter,79 the Florida Court
of appeals affirmed a punitive damage award in a strict
liability and negligence action. The plaintiffs claimed the
71 See Pease v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 114 Cal. Rptr. 416
(1974).
72 Id. at 459, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
73 Id. at 461, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
74 Id. at 462, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
75 132 Ariz. 47, 643 P.2d 1017 (1982).
76 Id. at 1018.
77 Id.
7H Id. at 1021.
7s, 426 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1983).
1986] 581
582 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
aircraft had a faulty door which suddenly opened during
the flight, causing the pilot to lose control. 80 The jury
found for the defendant on the negligence claim, but con-
cluded in special interrogatories that the aircraft was de-
fective when sold. 8'
The record in support of the punitive damage verdict
included knowledge of the door openings by Piper's test
pilot on the same model aircraft between 1954 and 1959,
communication by the test pilot to his superiors of the
need to modify the plane, actions by the company to con-
ceal evidence of its knowledge of the defect to the extent
that it ordered the test pilot to destory any records he had
pertaining to problems with the aircraft and, finally, the
manufacturer's failure to warn purchasers of the defect.82
The court of appeals concluded that the punitive damage
claim was predicated on Piper's post-design conduct
rather than on its originally negligent design of the air-
craft.83 Piper's record of active concealment led the jury
to conclude that the manufacturer acted in bad faith even
before the aircraft entered the marketplace.84
3. Other Products
Conduct of the sort that led to the recent punitive dam-
age verdict against Piper has also been a factor in a range
of products liability actions involving asbestos materials
and the cascade of litigation relating to the Dalkon shield.
Jury verdicts with large punitive damage components
have been assessed against Johns-Manville based upon its
knowledge dating back to the mid-1930's of the health
hazards posed to workers regularly exposed to asbestos
particles. An appellate division of the Superior Court of
New Jersey recently affirmed a lower court verdict that in-
I ld. at 1109.
I' /d.




cluded a $300,000 punitive damage award.85 The court
was influenced by the evidence of bad faith exhibited by
Manville in its post-marketing conduct.8 6
Punitive damages are also frequent components of ver-
dicts in the cases arising out of the use of the Dalkon
shield. Fraud, concealment and failure to warn in the
post-marketing period are aspects of the manufacturer's
conduct influencing large verdicts. Prior to marketing the
Dalkon Shield intra-uterine device (IUD), A. H. Robbins,
the manufacturer, made several design modifications
without subjecting the changes to clinical testing. 7 It
then engaged in an intensive promotional campaign di-
rected to both the medical community and the general
public. 88 The advertising stated that the Dalkon shield
had a pregnancy rate far lower than the scientific data in
the hands of the manufacturer actually suggested.8 9
Shortly after Robbins began marketing the IUD, it was in-
formed that the nylon filaments of the shield's tail string
could carry bacteria from the vagina into the uterus and
cause infection. Despite this information, the manufac-
turer chose not to make any changes in the product.9 0
Several years later, after additional scientific evidence was
widely circulated about the health problems associated
with the shield, Robbins sent a letter to physicians in
which it outlined the information that it had acquired. 9'
The manufacturer's warning to physicians came too
long after it had learned of the product's dangers for the
8. See Fischer v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 133, 472 A.2d 577
(Ct. App. Div. 1984).
sc Fischer, 472 A.2d at 588.
The jury here was justified in concluding that both defendants, fully
appreciating the nature, extent and gravity of the risk, nevertheless
[sic] made a conscious and coldblooded business decision, in utter
and flagrant disregards of the rights of others, to take no protective
or remedial action.
Id.
7 See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195-96 (Colo. 1984).
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letter to have any effect in mitigating punitive damages.
Punitive damage verdicts ranging from $500,00092 to $6.2
million 93 were affirmed against Robbins in 1984. Since
over 1,500 suits have been filed, more large verdicts may
follow. The Robbins experience again proves that the
combination of fraudulent conduct and active conceal-
ment sow the seeds of large punitive damage verdicts.
III. STRATEGIES FOR CURBING PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARDS
The frequency with which large punitive damage ver-
dicts are being awarded has renewed interest in control-
ling this powerful, but seemingly unpredictable, remedy.
The proffered solutions vary substantially in scope and
feasibility. Some solutions are being employed by courts.
Others have been tested and rejected. Still other pro-
posed solutions will require major institutional changes
before they can be tried and evaluated.
A. Measures That Have Been Implemented
Some courts have already reacted to the escalation of
punitive damage awards by giving more exacting scrutiny
to the quality of evidence of the defendant's conduct of-
fered by plaintiffs. Many marginal claims can be weeded
out if the trial courts insist on an adequate threshold of
proof before giving punitive damage instructions.94 Simi-
larly, greater use of the remittitur device by both the trial
and appellate courts can effectively reduce the potential of
'1 Worsham v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 734 F.2d 676 (11 th Cir. 1984).
w4 Palmer, 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
94 Fischer, 472 A.2d 577, 586.
We concur, moreover, with the judicial consensus that the legitimate
interests of products-liability defendants can be served by careful ju-
dicial scrutiny of the adequacy of plaintiffs' proofs regarding outra-
geous conduct, by monitoring excessive punitive damage awards,
and by allowing the introduction into evidence of all pertinent finan-
cial circumstances of the defendant, including its contingent
liabilities.
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seemingly irrational or emotional verdicts.9 5
Some state legislatures and courts have responded to
concerns about multiple punishment for the same con-
duct by permitting defendants to introduce evidence of
prior punitive damage awards in the hope that such infor-
mation will mitigate further punishment.96 The downside
risk for defendants employing this strategy is that it might
increase the chance ofjuries finding against the defendant
on the contested liability issues.97 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. ,98 apply-
ing Mississippi law, reversed a punitive damage award be-
cause it considered informing juries of past punitive
damage awards and the likelihood of additional verdicts in
the future to be an unsatisfactory means of exercising ju-
dicial control. 99
Another solution has been to withhold the introduction
1,5 See Maxey v. Freightliner, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (district
court set aside jury's award of$ 10,000,000 punitive damages), aff'd, 633 F.2d 395
(5th Cir. 1982); Hanson v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th
Cir. 1984) (trial court had awarded plaintiff $260,000 for loss of her husband's
care and services, $800,000 for the decedent's pain and suffering and $1,000,000
in punitive damages. The fifth circuit reduced actual damages to $40,000 and
$250,000 respectively. Id. at 1047. It then applied a Texas law requiring punitive
damages found and reduced the punitive award to $300,000. Id.)
- See, e.g., Wangen, 294 N.W.2d at 460.
17 Wheeler, supra note 40 at 295.
727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 527. But see Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d 1036
(5th Cir. 1984). A different panel of the Fifth Circuit applying Texas law, rejected
Manville's argument that the result in Jackson should apply in this wrongful death
action. The court contrasted the Jackson panel's interpretation of Mississippi's pu-
nitive damages law that such damages are unavailable in products liability cases
with a provision of the Texas constitution that makes punitive damages available
in strict liability actions. Id. at 1041.
"[T]heJackson panel determined that the presence of a viable enter-
prise is essential to the maintenance of effective loss distribution in
strict liability. . . .[A]t the point at which awards of punitive dam-
ages destroy the viability of the enterprise, the remedy of punitive
damages becomes the antithetical to the policy of strict liability and
thus. . . punitive damages must not be allowed. . . .[W]e find that
we are unable to follow Jackson in this case. At least one Texas court
has said that punitive damages may be recovered under Article 16,
Section 26 of the Constitution of the State of Texas in a strict liabil-
itv action .
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of evidence regarding a defendant's wealth until a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case for punitive damages. This
approach has been adopted by statute in Oregon.' 00 It is
closely related to the general need for increasing the
threshold of proof for punitive damages.10'
B. Other Alternatives
1. Class Actions
A strategy designed to eliminate multiple punishment is
the creation of a single punitive damage pool through the
class action device. The reasoning behind the class action
approach is attractive. Since many products-based mass
torts such as the asbestos and Dalkon shield cases involve
thousands of claims by similarly situated plaintiffs, consol-
idation of claims in one action would save time and
resources. 1
02
Several courts have spoken favorably of the class action
alternative; 10 3 however, the two instances in which it was
tested by federal district courts resulted in reversals. 0 4 A
district court in Northern California certified a class of
Dalkon shield claimants under Federal Rule 23(B)(1)(b).
One of the reasons given for certification was the risk of
nonpayment of future punitive damage claims because the
amount of damages being sought by plaintiffs individually
.. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(2) (1979).
1 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
11-2 See Comment, The Punitive Damage Class Action: A Solution to the Problem of Mul-
tiple Punishment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 163.
.... See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 527 (5th Cir.
1984). The court also recognized the drawbacks of the class actibn device.
A single class action for recovery of one award of punitive damages
might be an attractive alternative from a theoretical point of view,
but does not appear feasible. Because the losses are widespread and
disparate, the vital legal issues would not be common to all plaintiffs,
nor would the applicable legal standards be identical in all jurisdic-
tions in which the cases would arise.
Id.
In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shields" IUD Prods. Liab. Litg., 526 F.
Supp. 887 (N.D.Cal. 1981), vacated & remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), class decertified, 680 F.2d 1175
(8th Cir. 1982).
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exceeded the defendant's net worth.' 05 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that punitive
damage claims would not necessarily affect later claims,
and second, the punitive damage standard of conduct va-
ried so substantially among different jurisdictions that
some plaintiffs would be unfairly prejudiced by the federal
court applying a less favorable standard than what would
have been used in an individual action.10 6
While other problems involving the use of class actions
remain to be resolved, the approach offers an opportunity
to remedy many of the burdens faced by mass tort liti-
gants, especially the onerous cost of multiple actions.
Thus, it is a remedy that offers promise.
2. Bifurcation
Another way to control punitive damage awards is
through bifurcation of the liability and punitive damage
issues. It is suggested that through preventing juries from
considering possibly inflammatory evidence of the de-
fendant's wealth until the question of liability is deter-
mined, the likelihood of juries inflating the compensatory
damage award will be reduced.1 0 7 Bifurcation might re-
duce the need for courts to either remit or vacate punitive
damage awards that are clearly influenced by passion and
prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
While there are many reasons for alarm at the fre-
quency and amount of punitive damage awards being
granted by juries, it appears juror reaction is not entirely
unpredictable. Evidence of a manufacturer's good faith
action to mitigate the harm caused by possible product
defects can preclude punitive awards. Furthermore,
products liability defendants should be aware that courts
111 See Comment, supra note 102, at 163.
Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 851.
,,, Wheeler, supra note 40, at 301.
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are increasingly receptive to consideration of procedural
devices that will reduce the chance of multiple punish-
ment and lead to more dispassionate results.
